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TAXATION UNDER THE FEDERAL SOCIAL SECUR-
ITY ACT: CONSTITUTIONAL AND
REGULATORY ASPECTS
LEsTER B. ORFIELD
On May 24, 1937, just a week before adjournment for the summer, the
Supreme Court of the United States in Chas. C. Steward v. Davis,' and
Helvering v. Davis,2 upheld the constitutionality of the Federal Social Se-
curity Act.8 To speak more precisely, it upheld those phases of the Act
which seemed most dubious from a constitutional standpoint and which,
according to previous precedents, admitted of judicial review. The validity
of those Titles of the Act not passed upon may be conclusively presumed.
The Court upheld those phases of the Act which were most significant as
well as novel from a sociological standpoint, namely, the provisions dealing
with unemployment compensation 4 and federal old-age benefits."
The decisions came almost two years after the enactment, the Act having
been signed by President Roosevelt on August 14, 1935. 6 They climaxed
a series of important decisions on constitutionality, most of which had gone
against the New Deal. They came after the November, 1936 election after
which, it has sometimes been pointed out, all important decisions have gone
in favor of the New Deal, notably in the National Labor Relations case,7 a
decision which doubtless came as a welcome surprise to most advocates of
the New Deal. Possibly of equal significance, they came at a time when
the Supreme Court was undergoing the most violent criticism which had been
indulged against it since the administration of Theodore Roosevelt. Some
there are who will assert that the decisions were therefore not strictly on
the merits but based upon avoiding further conflict with Congress and the
President and bolstering up the position of the Court; that such recent
'57 Sup. Ct. 883, 81 L. ed. 779 (1937).
'57 Sup. Ct. 904, 81 L. ed. 804 (1937). The respondent in the former case was Harwelf
G. Davis, Collector of Internal Revenue for Alabama; while in the present case he
was George P. Davis, a stockholder in the Edison Electric Illuminating Company of
Boston.
149 STAT. L. 620, c. 531, 42 U. S. C. A. § 7 (Supp.).
'Title IX. The court did not pass on Title III, but since the court found it was sep-
arable its validity was assumed.
'Titles II and VIII. The holding as to Title VIII was confined to the tax on
employers.
'However, the Title IX taxes on employers if eight or more did not come into effect
until 1936 and were payable as late as January 31, 1937, U. S. Treasury Dept. Regula-
tions 90, Art. 303, while the Title VIII taxes on employers and employees did not come
into effect until 1937, the first not becoming due until on or before Feb. 28, 1937. U. S.
TREASURY DET. REG. 91, Art. 410 (1936). Because of the lateness of the due date of
such taxes the government might perhaps have objected to earlier consideration on the
ground of prematurity.
National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 57 Sup. Ct. 615 (1937).
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decisions as Railroad Retirenent Board v. Alton R. Co.8 and United States v.
Butler9 indicated that the Court would reject the philosophy of the Social
Security Act. The proponents of the Court will reply that the prior cases
admitted of reasonable distinction, that the Social ,Security Act was drawn
after the New Deal had profited by its mistakes in its earlier legislation,
and that Mr. Chief Justice Hughes had voted with the liberal judges in a
,considerable number of cases, with Mr. Justice Roberts also supporting them
-occasionally.
The Court divided five to four on the validity of the Title IX tax, popularly
-referred to as the Federal Unemployment Insurance Tax.'0 The majority
-opinion was rendered by Mr. Justice Cardozo"- and fully concurred in by
Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Brandeis, Stone, and Roberts. Justices
.Sutherland and Van Devanter objected to the unemployment reserve fund
feature, but did not find the provisions dealing with the fund separable and
-so' found the whole Title invalid. Seven Justices thus thought the basic
features of the tax valid since the trust fund might easily be dropped out by
;amendment to the Act. Justices McReynolds and Butler thought the whole
'Title unconstitutional as an invasion of states' rights. The two latter wrote
separafe opinions while Mr. Justice Sutherland wrote one concurred in by
Mr. Justice Van Devanter.
The validity of the Title VIII Tax on employers,' 2 popularly referred to
-as the Federal Old Age Pension Tax, and of the Title II benefits was upheld
by a vote of seven to two, the only dissenting votes being those of Justices
McReynolds and Butler. As in the case of the Federal Unemployment In-
surance Tax, the majority opinion was rendered by Mr. Justice Cardozo.
No opinions were written by the dissenting Justices, the report stating merely
that they were "of opinion that the provisions of the Act here challenged are
8295 U. S. 330, 55 Sup. Ct. 758, 79 L. ed. 1468 (1934). This case is cited by Mr. Jus-
tice Sutherland, in his opinion in the Alabama State Unemployment Compensation Law
-case, as forbidding pooled fund state unemployment compensation laws. Carmichael v.
So. Coal & Coke Co., 81 L. ed. 811, 826, 827 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
'297 U. S. 1, 80 L. ed. 477, 102 A. L. R. 914 (1935). However, none of the dis-
•senting opinions in the Social Security cases rely on United States v. Butler. In the
Federal Unemployment Insurance Tax case the majority opinion expressly pointed out
that the Agricultural Adjustment Act differed in several respects from the Title IX
provisions. Carmichael v. So. Coal & Coke Co., 81 L. ed. 779, 790 (1936). In July,
1937, after the President's Court proposal had been killed through recommitment, how-
ever, President Roosevelt asserted that his efforts had not been in vain since the
decisions in the Social Security cases amounted to a reversal of United States v. Butler.
"
0Such usage is purely popular since the government insisted and the Supreme Court
'held that the funds raised flow into the general treasury funds and may be used for
any purpose proper for government.
'To Mr. Justice McReynolds, the beautifully worded opinion of the majority by Mr.
Justice Cardozo, seems to have been a mere "cloud of words." Carmichael v. So. Coal
& Coke Co., supra note 8 (1936).
'The Court did not pass on the Title VIII tax on employees.
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repugnant to the Tefith Amendment, and that the decree of the Circuit
Court of Appeals sh6uld be affirmed."' 1
On the same day on which the Court handed down its decisions uphold-
ing the Federal Social Security Act, it also decided Carmichael v. Soilthern
Coal & Coke Co. sustaining the Alabama State Unemployment Compensation
Law.' 4 As in the case of the decision on the federal unemployment insurance
tax, the vote was five to four with the same Justices favoring and the same
opposing. The majority opinion was rendered by Mr. Justice Stone, who
had taken no part in the decision on November 23, 1936 upholding by a
four to four votel 5 the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in favor
of the validity of the New York Unemployment Compensation Law.16 The
case was on appeal from a decision by a three judge court from the Federal
District Court of Alabama, holding the Alabama Law unconstitutional.17
Mr. Justice Sutherland rendered a dissenting opinion concurred in by Jus-
tices Van Devanter and Butler.'8 This dissenting opinion did, however,
approve of such laws as the Wisconsin employers' reserve account plan,
since adopted only in Nebraska. Eight of the nine justices thus approved of
the latter type of unemployment compensation law. Mr. Justice McReynolds
dissented without opinion.
Some study of this last decision is essential for several reasons. The un-
employment compensation provisions of the Federal Act would obviously be
futile if the states could not constitutionally pass state unemployment com-
pensation laws. They would also be largely futile if pooled fund systems
were not allowed as almost all states had adopted such laws. They would
also be futile if the state laws were regarded as unconstitutional because their
enactment was induced by the federal provisions. They would also be futile
if a state could not deposit its unemployment compensation fund in the
Treasury of the United States. Moreover, the reasoning of the Court as
to the validity of the exceptions in the Alabama State Law was applied by
the Court to the exceptions in the federal unemployment insurance tax and
the federal old age pension tax. The holding that the beneficiaries need
not show indigence is probably applicable to the Federal Old Age Pension
case as is the holding that an employer could not attack the tax on employees.
"57 Sup. Ct. 88, 81 L. ed. 804, 811 (1936).2'57 Sup. Ct. 868, 81 L. ed. 811 (1936).
W. H. H. Chamberlin v. Andrews, 299 U. S. 515, 57 Sup. Ct., 122 (1936). Such a
decision is not strictly binding as a precedent. Etting v. Bank of United States, 11
Wheat. 59, 6 L. ed. 419 (U. S. 1836); Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U. S. 205, 30 Sup.
Ct. 621, 54 L. ed. 1001 (1910). The holding was ignored in Gulf States Paper Cor-
poration v. Carmichael, 17 Fed. Supp. 225, 229 (1936). The House of Lords has adopted
a different rule. Beamish v. Beamish, 9 H. L. Cas., 274, 338 (1861).
18W. H. H. Chamberlin, Inc. v. Andrews, 276 N. Y. 1, 2 N. E. (2d) 22 (1936).
'17 Fed. Supp. 225 (1937).
'Supra note 8.
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The frequent attempts by the United States Government to secure delay
in the hearing of cases involving the constitutionality of Acts of Congress19
and the less common situations where the government wished to expedite
the hearing make the form of the procedure under which the Social Security
cases arose of interest. The Federal Unemployment Insurance Tax case -2 0
came up on writ of certiorari from a decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals21 affirming a judgment of the Federal District Court for the District
of Alabama dismissing a complaint in a suit to recover back a tax paid under
Title IX.22 The Federal Old Age Pension case also came up on writ of
certiorari,23 but from a decision of the First Circuit Court of Appeals "2 4
reversing a decree of the Federal District Court for Massachusetts, which
dismissed a bill by a stockholder to restrain a corporation from paying taxes
levied under Title VIII. It was by, the very narrowest margin that
the Supreme Court was willing to pass upon the constitutionality of Titie
VIII. Four of the Justices, Brandeis, Stone, Roberts, and Cardozo, the last
of whom wrote the opinion, took the view that the case was not properly one
for an injunction since the legal remedy was adequate. That is to say, the
stockholder should have waited until the corpoation made the tax payment,
then if the corporation showed no disposition to seek a refund, the share-
holder might sue in equity to compel the corporation to seek a refund.2 3
'The earlier policy of the government was to object to any decision determining the
constitutionality of the Social Security Act on the ground of prematurity. See the brief
for the government in Pulaski Trucking Corporation v. Newark Milk Company, a case
arising in the Federal District Court for New Jersey on June, 1936.
'57 Sup. Ct. 673 (1936). Certiorari was granted in March 29, nine days after the
decision in the Circuit Court.
'Chas. C. Steward Match Co. v. Davis, 89 F. (2d) 207 (March 20, 1937). The case
was argued in the Supreme Court on April 8th and 9th, or only eighteen days after the
decision in the Circuit Court.
--The District Court did not write an opinion. Title IX was upheld by the Federal
District Court for Massachusetts, Davis v. Boston & Maine R. R., 17 F. Supp. 97
(Dec. 7, 1936). This decision was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit on April 14, 1937 by a two to one vote, 89 F. (2d) 368. Title IX was also
upheld by the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Alabama in Beeland
Wholesale Co. v. Davis, 17 Fed. Supp. 529 (Jan. 14, 1937), affirmed by the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in 88 F. (2d) 447 (Feb. 16, 1937), which latter case,
however, went off mainly on the ground that the remedy was not in equity. An injunc-
tion and a declaratory judgment were refused without decision on constitutionality in
Aponau Mfg..Co.-v. Fly (S. D. Miss., Jan. 4, 1937) 17 Fed. Supp. 944, affirmed by the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in 87 F. (2d) 997 in a per curiam decision.
Title IX was upheld incidental to decisions upholding state unemployment compensa-
tion acts in Gillum v. Johnson, 62 Pac. (2d) 1037, 108 A. L. R. 595 (Cal. Nov. 25,
1936) ; Howes Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts Unemployment Corp. Comm., 5 N. E. (2d)
720 (Mass. 1936) ; and Beeland Wholesale Co. v. Kaufman, 174 So. 516 (Ala. March,
1937).
2The petition was filed on April 20 and granted on April 26, 1937.
2'Davis v. Edison Electric Illuminating Co. of Boston, 89 F. (2d) 393 decided on
April 14, 1937.
218 Fed. Supp. 1 (1937).
"Compare the similar readiness to take jurisdiction in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
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But a majority of the Court, including Justices McReynolds and Butler who
thought the Act unconstitutional, were of the view that the Court should take
jurisdiction since both the government and the taxpayer waived the ob-
jection as to the adequacy of the legal remedy.2 7
The Alabama State Unemployment Compensation Law case was passed
upon by the Supreme Court as of right, coming up on appeal instead of by
petition for writ of certiorari. Though a state law was involved, the case
arose in a federal court;28 and since a statutory three judge court was in-
volved, the case went up directly to the Supreme Court. The lower court
granted an injunction at the suit of employers covered by the act.
The result of taking jurisdiction in the Federal Old Age Pension case was
to obtain a ruling on all phases of the Social Security Act before the fall of
1937. The validity of the federal old age pension Titles was argued on2
May 5th, the decision thus coming -but nineteen days later, whereas the
validity of the Alabama State Unemployment Compensation Law 0 was argued
on April 7th and 8th and that of the Federal Unemployment Insurance Tax31
on April 8th and 9th, intervals of a month and a half thus elapsing in the
two latter cases.
Analyses of the Act
The Social Security Act of August, 1935 is made up of eleven loosely knit
Titles administered by several agencies. The only relation these Titles bear
to one another is that they all serve a common humanitarian.purpose. Several
of the Titles might have been omitted and other provisions added32 or
substituted without impairing the logical consistency of the Act. The chief
Authority, 56 Sup. Ct. 466 (1936). However, in that case, as Mr. Justice Cardozo
pointed out upon oral argument, the directors had not discretion to make an unconsti-
tutional payment or to yield to an unconstitutional demand since the loss would be
irreparable; but in the present case the directors in their discretion could pay and after-
wards sue to get it back. SEN. Doc. No. 71, p. 4, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
"The majority of the court distinguished the case from a case decided by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals denying equitable relief, Norman v. Consolidated Gas Co.,
89 F. (2d) 619, decided April 12, 1937, on the ground that there the remedy was chal-
lenged by the Company and the government at every stage of the proceeding, thus
withdrawing any discretion from the court.
117 Fed. Supp. 225 (Dec. 15, 1936). The petitions for appeal were filed and granted
Jan. 20th and 30th, 1937.
'To summarize the dates and steps involved, the decision of the district court was on
Jan. 27, that of the circuit court on April 14, petition for certiorari was filed on April
20 and granted on April 26, oral argument was on May 5 and decision on May 24,
1937.
"T°he three judge federal court gave its decision on Dec. 15, 1936, petitions for appeal
were filed and granted on Jan. 20 and 30th, 1937, oral argument was on April 7 and 8th,
and decision on May 24.
"The decision of the district court was on March 11, that of the circuit court on
March 20th, petition for certiorari was filed on March 26th and granted on March
29th, oral argument on April 8th and 9th, and decision on May 24th.
nHealth insurance is now the chief subject of discussion.
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governmental agency set up by the Act is the Social Security Board. Title
VII of the Act provides for an independent Board of three members, not
more than two of whom shall be members of the same political party, ap-
pointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate for
rotating terms of six years. This Board has charge of grants-in-aid for
the administration of the state unemployment compensation laws, the grants
to the states for assistance to the needy aged, blind, and children, and, most
important of all, the federal old-age benefits program. The Board is also
charged with the duty of engaging in research in order to make recom-
mendations as to legislation concerning old-age pensions, unemployment com-
pensation, accident compensation, and other social insurance subjects. The
Board administers Titles I, II, III, IV, VII, IX (in part), and X of the
Act.
Four other government agencies are involved. Those pare of Title V
providing for maternal and child-health services, services for crippled chil-
dren, and child-welfare services are administered by the Children's Bureau
of the Department of Labor. Part four of Title V dealing with vocational
rehabilitation is administered by the office of Education of the Department
of the Interior. The provisions for public-health work under Title VI
are administered by the Bureau of Public Health Service of the Department
of the Treasury. Finally, all the taxes levied under the Social Security Act
(Titles VIII and IX) are administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue of
the Department of the Treasury. The recent decisions of the Supreme Court
affect only the duties of the latter and of the Social Security Board.
Title XI of the Act makes it applicable to Alaska, Hawaii, and the Dis-
trict of Columbia, as well as to the states. The Secretary of Labor and the
Secretary of the Treasury, as well as the Social Security Board, are au-
thorized to make such rules and regulations as will facilitate the performance
of the duties which are imposed upon them in the Act.
Of far greater significance than the administrative Titles of the Act are those
making provision for grants-in-aid.33 There are six such Titles (I, III, IV,
V, VI, and X). None of these Titles bears any relation to the taxing Titles
(VIII and IX), except possibly Title III. 3- Title I provides for grants to
states maintaining old-age assistance plans approved by the Social Security
Board in accordance with provisions set forth in the Title. Such old age
assistance is to be sharply differentiated from the federal old age benefits
provided for under Title II in that the latter is administered entirely by the
"For an excellent critique of the grants-in-aid as used in the Social Security Act, see
Horack, Federal-State Cooperation for Social Security: The Grant-in-Aid (1935) 30
ILL L. Rxv. 292.
'The Court found no legal relation between Titles III and IX, Charles C. Steward
v. Davis, supra note 1, p. 793.
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Federal Government and is a matter of right instead of need. Title IV
provides in much the same form for grants to the states for aid to dependent
children, and Title X for grants to the states for aid to the needy blind.
Title V is divided into four parts. Part I authorizes an annual appropria-
tion to be allocated among states having approved plans for promoting the
health of mothers and children, especially in rural and depressed areas. Part
II authorizes an annual appropriation to be allocated for 'aid to crippled
children. Part III authorizes an annual appropriation for child-welfare
services for use by state welfare agencies cooperating on the basis of plans
developed jointly by the state and federal agencies. Part IV authorizes an
annual appropriation for cooperation with the states in the extension of
vocational rehabilitation programs developed under the Act of June 2, 1920.
Title VI authorizes an annual appropriation to be allocated among the
states by the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service for aid in
establishing and maintaining adequate public health services and another
annual appropriation to the Public Health Service for the investigation of
disease and problems of sanitation.
These grant-in-aid Titles present no constitutional problems other than
those involved in Massachusetts v. Mellon and Frothingham v. Mellon.85
In these cases it was sought to enjoin enforcement of the Sheppard-Towner
Maternity Act.3 6  By the terms of this Act, the Federal Government, for
the purpose of reducing maternal and infant mortality, offered grants of
money to the states complying with stipulated conditions. The Supreme
Court held that neither a state nor a taxpayer had any standing to ask for a
judicial review of a federal appropriation statute . 7  A taxpayer was held
to have an interest in the general funds of the treasury which was too minute
and indeterminable to furnish a basis for a challenge of the use of such funds.
A state could not object since it was under no obligation to accept the
federal offer; nor could it object as parens patriae since the Federal Govern-
ment, not the state, properly filled the r6le of parens patriae in all relations
between the Federal Government and the citizen. The authority of these
cases was expressly saved in United States v. Butler.38 It is significant that
Mr. Justice Sutherland in a dictum in his dissenting opinion in the Federal
Unemployment Insurance Tax case stated that Title I providing for old age
-262 U. S. 447 (1923).
242 STAT. 224 (1921).
7That the grants-in-aid cannot be assailed and that in any case they are valid on
the merits is conceded by Charles Denby, Jr., The Case Against the Constitutionality of
the Social Security Act (April, 1936) 3 LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 315, 329.
That on principle this procedural limitation is unsound was asserted by J. A. C. Grant,
Commerce, Production, and the Fiscal Powers of Congress (1936) 45 YALE L. J.
751, 776, and see Frank E. Horack, Jr., Federal-State Codperation for Social Security:
The Grant-in-Aid (1935) 30 ILL. L. REv. 292, 308.
1297 U. S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 312, 315 (1936).
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assistance was an illustration of permissible cooperation between the state
and federal governments.8 9
The Titles which were .litigated in the recent Supreme Court cases, Titles
II, 111,40 VIII, and IX may be referred to as the social insurance Titles
since they were designed largely to prevent destitution rather than to re-
lieve it and since they made provision for contributions by the beneficiaries
of their employers. These Titles set up programs of unemployment com-
pensation and federal old-age benefits.
Excise Character of the Taxes on Employers
Title IX lays a tax on certain employers of eight or more, and Title
VIII lays a tax on certain employers of one or more. It was strongly
argued that these taxes were not excises, 4 ' since a tax based on employment
was not embraced within the constitutional concept of excise taxes. The
Court rejected both the historical and logical arguments that these taxes
were not excises. 42
With respect to the historical argument, the Court pointed out that though
in Colonial days excises were usually associated with the enjoyment or the
use of property, this did not mean that the existing forms of excises could
not be enlarged. The Court was, however, able to find several cases of
other forms of excises both in English and Colonial history. In 1777,
Parliament had laid upon employers an annual "duty" of twenty-one shill-
ings for "every male Servant" employed in certain forms of work.48 The
Court pointed out that this was an example of a tax not based on the use
of commodities and deemed it immaterial that it was regarded as a tax
upon a luxury, since it did not cover employments in business. Moreover a
Virginia statute of 1780 laid a tax on employment in general. 44
The Court also rejected the argument based on logic, namely, that while
an excise tax may be laid upon the exercise of a "privilege" it could not
be laid upon a "natural" right such as employment. The Court squarely
ruled that so-called natural rights are as much subject to taxation as are
'57 Sup. Ct. 883, 81 L. ed. 779, 799, 800 (1937).
"The Court did not pass on Title III, though its validity was attacked.
'The Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in a two to one decision holding
Title IX invalid held that the tax was not an excise in George P. Davis v. Boston &
Maine P. R., 89 F. (2d) 368 (April 14, 1937). The court made the same ruling as to
the Title VIII tax. Davis v. Edison Electric Illuminating Co. of Boston, 89 F. (2d)
393 (1937).
"Supra note 8, p. 783. The Federal Old Age Pension case incorporated the reasoning
of the Federal Unemployment Insurance Tax case, Helvering v. Dauls, 81 L. ed. 804,
810 (1936). The Alabama State Unemployment Compensation case applied similar
reasoning to the Alabama tax on employers though not definitely calling the tax on
excise. Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., supra note 8, p. 815 (1936).
"Revenue Act of 1777, 17 GEo. III, c. 39.
"10 HENING'S STATUTES OF VIRGINIA, p. 244.
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lesser rights.4 5 The government was, therefore, not confined to the taxing
of vocations or activities which might be absolutely prohibited. In the
Federal Unemployment Insurance Tax case, the court assumed that the
states could unquestionably levy a tax based on employment for it stated
that the power of Congress as to the subject matter of taxation is as broad
as that of the states, except that the method of apportionment may at times
be different. The Alabama State Unemployment Insurance Tax case upheld
the power of a state to levy such a tax.48
That the privilege of employment might be created by state law was held
to make no difference. It was pointed out that Congress has lawfully taxed
the transmission of property by inheritance or will in spite of the fact that
tghe states have created the privilege of succession; and Congress has right-
fully taxed the enjoyment of a corporate franchise though a state has brought
the franchise into being.
Uniformity of the Taxes
As excises, the taxes were bound to conform to the constitutional principle
of uniformity. The Court had no difficulty with this requirement. Uni-
formity under the settled doctrine was held to mean geographical, not
intrinsic, uniformity.47 The tax was uniform though the rates of taxation
would vary from state to state because of the credit plan. That such credit
'The court cited the essay by Professor John McArthur Maguire, "Taxing the Exer-
cise of Natural Rights" HARvARD LEGAL. EssAYS (1934) pp. 273, 332. The seemingly
contrary Massachusetts cases were said to rest on the peculiar language of the Massa-
chusetts Constitution.
However, in Foster & Creighton Co. v. Graham, 154 Tenn. 412, 285 S. W. 570, 47
A. L. R. 971 (1926), the court stated that an "excise tax is synonymous with a privi-
lege tax."
"One of the noteworthy features of the Alabama case was the willingness of the
Supreme Court to follow the view of the Alabama Supreme Court, treating the exaction
as a tax levied under the taxing power of the State rather than as a contribution levied
under the police power. In Mountain Timber Co. v. Cohington, 243 U. S. 219 (1919),
the Court expressly refused to consider whether the Washington Workmen's Compen-
sation Act involved a tax or a regulation under the state's police power. The state
acts are not ordinarily in the form of revenue measures in two respects: merit rating is
inconsistent with the ordinary concept of a tax; and the funds are earmarked for the
payment of benefit claims. The taxing power seems broader than the police power.
See Rice, A Note on the Constitutionality of State Unemployment Compensation Laws
(1936) 3 LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, 138, 145. The New York and California
courts seemed to view the exaction as being a tax. W. H. H. Chamberlin, Inc. v.
Andrews, 271 N. Y. 1, 2 N. E. (2d) 22 (1936); Gillum v. Johnson, 62 P. (2d) 1037,
108 A. L. R. 595 (1936). The Massachusetts Court leaned to the police power theory.
Howes Bros. v. Massachusetts Unemployment Commission, 5 N. E. (2d) 720, 728
(Mass. 1936). Workmen's Compensation Insurance was once viewed by some as involv-
ing an exercise of the taxing power, but today is viewed as an exercise of the police
power. James A. Pike, Unemployment Inmtrance and Workmen's Compensation (1937)
10 So. L. Rav. 253, 258, n. 39.
"Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 81 L. ed. 779, 786. (1936).
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did not detract from uniformity was expressly held in Florida v. Mellon,
the statutory model for Title IX.
48
But the additional credit provisions strain even the doctrine of Florida
v. Mellon. They are designed to protect the advantages secured by the
merit-rating and reserve devices. They give credit against the tax beyond
amounts actually paid to the state; that is to say, they give credit for good
behavior. Thus, the percentage of the federal tax is varied not only by the
amounts payable to the states as in Florida v. Mellon, but also by the
existence of merit rating and reserve plans. The Court did not expressly pass
upon the validity of the additional credit provisions.49 There was no need of
so doing since they were not yet operative.
Income Tax on Employees
The Title IX tax, as has been seen, was levied only on employers. Title
VIII, however, provides not only for an excise tax on employers 0 but
also for an income tax on employees.51 The Federal Old Age Pension
case, however, did not pass on the validity of this latter tax, although the
employer sought to attack it on the ground that it caused restlessness among
the employees. 52 No employee was attacking the imposition of such tax.
Suit was brought by the shareholder of a corporation, which was an em-
ployer subject to the excise tax imposed. In the Alabama State Unemploy-
nent Compensation case it was expressly held that the employer could not
attack the Alabama state tax levied on employees.
53
As a practical matter, it is not likely that employees will ever attack Title
VIII. They stand. to gain too rmuch under the present act for such action.
They receive not only the benefit of their own contributions, but that of
their employers. Only the younger men with relatively high salaries could
do better with private insurance companies and then only if both their own
and their employers' contributions were invested. 54 Although the maximum
taxes on employees are three per cent of wages, each employee or his estate
will receive back at least three and one-half per cent of his wages and one
drawing monthly benefits may receive, back considerably more.55
273 U S. 12, 47 Sup. Ct. 265, 71 L. ed. 511 (1937).
,*The circuit court below expressly stated that it did not consider the additional credit
provisions since they were not yet operative. See fn. 89 F. (2d) 207, 209 (1937).
W§ 804.
=§ 801.
=Steward Machine Co v. Davis, 81 L. ed. 804, 810 (1936). The Circuit Court below
passed on the tax on employees as well as employers, holding both invalid. 89 F. (2d)
393 (1936). The latter court intimated that since the tax on employers was invalid,
that on employees must also be invalid since Congress would not have exposed only the
latter tax.
u81 L. ed. 811, 818 (1936).
"'EPSTEIN, INSECURITY, A CHALLENGE To AMERICA (3d ed. 1936) 765-766; STEWART,
SOCIAL SECURITY (1937) 153.
r'§§ 202-204.
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Due Process Aspect
Neither the Title IX nor Title VIII taxes cover all classes of employment.
The argument that the exemptions amounted to violations of the' Fifth
Amendment was rejected.5" In no case had such an attack upon a federal
tax been sustained. The Court, however, stated that it assuined that dis-
crimination, if great enough, was equivalent to confiscation and in violation
of the Fifth Amendment. The Court pointed out that the Fifth Amendment,
which governs the powers of Congress, has no equal protection clause such
as does the Fourteenth Amendment governing the states. Furthermore,
even the states have great discretion in selecting the subjects of taxation.
The states might properly tax a particular kind of business without taxing
other kinds of closely related businesses.
The Court, in passing upon the exemptions laid down in Title IX, regarded
them as justified on grounds of policy and practical convenience. It relied
upon the same considerations as justified the exemptions in the case of the
Alabama unemployment compensation law and instead of !repeating or
elaborating such considerations, simply made reference to the opinion in the
Alabama case. 57 The validity of the Title IX exemptions was regarded
as an a fortiori case since Congress is subject to no equal protection clause.
The Federal Old Age Pensions case also relied on the reasoning of the Ala-
bamna Unemployment Compensation case. 58 In the latter case, a tax on
employers of eight or more, such as that in Title IX, was held valid. 59
The line had to be drawn at some point, and eight was not an arbitrary
number. It might be more expensive and inconvenient to collect taxes from
small employers. No such problem arose as to the Title VIII tax since it
covered employers of one or more. Charitable institutions might be ex-
cepted in order to foster what the legislature conceives to be beneficent
enterprise. The same is true as to agriculture and shipping. Businesses
operating for less than twenty weeks in the year might be exempted for
similar reasons or to encourage seasonal or unstable industries.
As in the case of employers of less than eight, employers of domestic
servants, farmers, and family businesses, none of which is likely to main-
tain adequate employment records, may be exempted because of the greater
expense and inconvenience of collection. Government employees need not
be taxed since this amounts to self-taxation. A state, of course, may not
constitutionally tax federal employees and the converse is also true.
The Court did not consider the possible objection in the case of the Title
VIII taxes that such taxes were not levied on wages over $3,000.00. This
581 L ed. 779, 786 (1936) ; 81 L. ed. 804, 810 (1936).
581 L. ed. 779, 787 (1936).
'81 L. ed. 804, 810 (1936).
"81 L. ed. 811, 816 (1936).
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
was contrary to the economic principle of taxing those best able to pay, and
it also cut down the amount of revenue which might be raised. The seem-
ingly anomalous result followed that an employer having one employee to
whom he pays $6,000.00 is taxed upon $3,000.00 while an employer having
two employees during an entire year to each of whom he pays $3,000.00,
or one employee for six months at $3,000,00 and another employee for the
other six months at $3,000.00 is taxed upon $6,000.00 and a worker earn-
ing $6,000.00 from one employer is taxed on $3,000.00, while a worker
earning $3,000.00 from each of two employers is taxed on $6,000.00. But
each of these objections may be met. The employers' tax is based on the
privilege of employment and this privilege is exercised to a greater extent
when more workers are employed. Moreover, Congress could have fixed a
flat rate of $30.00 for employees upon the exercise of the right of employ-
ment. This would be equal to the maximum tax imposed by Title VIII for
1937. The $3,000.00 limitation as to workers may be justified on the ground
of avoiding cumulation of taxes since income above that amount is subject
to the graduated income tax; and since the Court ruled that Title II was
valid, it might have pointed out that no benefits were paid as to wages
over $3,000.00, thus making it inequitable to tax wages over that amount.
Coercion of the States
One of the most dubious, if not the most dubious, feature of the Title IX
tax was its apparently coercive effects. It was argued that these coercive
effects amounted to a contravention of the Tenth Amendment. The Title
VIII tax on its face contained none of these apparently coercive or regu-
latory features; it contained no credit provision and did not contemplate
the passage of any state laws; it was more dearly designed to bring 'in a
large amount of revenue.
The Court disposed of the contention in several ways.60 It pointed out
that the ninety per cent credit was largely relied on to show coercion. It
then proceeded to lay down a very heavy burden on the petitioner, who was
required to show (1) that separated from the credit provisions the revenue
provisions could not stand by themselves, 'and (2) that the tax and the
credit provisions when taken together were weapons of coercion. The Court
found it unnecessary to inquire as to whether there had been a showing of
the former61 inasmuch as the petitioner failed to make a showing of the
latter.
'Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 81 L. ed. 779, 787 (1936).
"The Circuit Court in the decision below seemed to doubt the separability of the tax
and credit. Circuit Judge Sibley stated in 89 F. (2d). 207 at 210: "Notwithstanding the
separability section of the act, it might be a serious question whether or not Congress
would have enacted the tax without the credit provisions."
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In concluding that Title IX amounts only to inducement and not to duress
or coercion, the Court cited the recent facts as to unemployment 62 and in
so many words stated that the use of federal money during a crisis to re-
lieve the unemployed and their dependents was not a use "for any purpose
narrower than the promotion of the general welfare." 64 Thus for the first
time in an important case, the Court applied the liberal holding of United
States v. Butler 3 as to expenditures for the general welfare. Congress might
pass measures designed to induce cooperation between the federal government
and the states to relieve unemployment. Without some stimulus from Con-
gress, the states would fail to act because of the fear of placing themselves
in a position of economic disadvantage as compared with, other states.6 5
Furthermore, if the states were not induced to pass laws, a disproportionate
burden of relief would have to be borne by the Federal Government. There-
fore, the Court resorted to the argument that the tax was for a legitimate,
expressly conferred power of the Federal Government, namely, its fiscal
and currency power.
A makeweight in support of constitutionality was the fact that the effect
of the credit provision was to avoid a duplication of taxes.66 The avoidance
of such duplication has been recognized as a legitimate end. It should be
noted, however, that if a state had an unapproved plan, dual taxation would
not be avoided. Nor can the additional credit provisions67 be defended iri
the ground of avoiding double taxation.
The Court, in examining the possible subjects of coercion, was unable
to find that any person or state had been coerced. The individual taxpayer
was not coerced since he paid only because the state, not the federal govern-
ment, compelled him to pay the contributions required under a state law.
It might have pointed out, also, that the taxpayer had to pay at all events,
the only difference being with respect to which government collected the
tax. Viewing the situation realistically, however, workers would certainly
be coerced since their employers would have to pay a tax without obtaining
Mr. Justice McReynolds, in his dissenting opinion, 81 L. ed. 779, 794 (1936) refers to
this as an "ostentatious parade of irrelevant statistics" which should not obscure the fact
that the reserved power of the states are being violated.
6U. S. v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 65, 66, 56 Sup. Ct. 312, 102 A. L. R. 914 (1936).881 L. ed. 779, 788 (1936).
"Any similar power under the Commerce Clause to equalize economic conditions was
denied in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 273 (1917).
"Professor Thomas Reed Powell contends that the major purpose of the federM estate
tax credit was to minimize cumulative taxation and that the purpose to induce the states
to impose inheritance taxes was secondary. The Processing Tax and the Social Security
Act, (Jan. 1936) 5 BR'xLYN L. REV. 125, 134. Professor Powell insists that from one
standpoint the Title IX tax credit is even more clearly constitutional than the estate
tax credit, inasmuch as the former results in relieving the Federal Government from the
necessity of federal expenditures for a federal purpose while the latter does not.
§§ 909-910.
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thereby corresponding benefits to their employees, who might also receive
less wages as a result of the tax.
Nor was the state coerced. The state of Alabama was not objecting that
it had been coerced. 68 Every tax is to some extent regulatory. Motive must
not be confused with coercion. The Court does not even admit that any
such concept as that of undue influence is applicable to the relations between
state and nation. As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court has now three
times denied that acts of Congress aimed to secure legislation by the states
were coercive, once as to grants-in-aid, and twice as to tax credits. 69 It
further stated that even if the concept were applicable, it would be a question
of degree when pressure ceased to be lawful inducement and turned into
unconstitutional compulsion. No such pressure was shown with respect to
the Title IX tax.
The Court made specific reference to the example of coercion in the case
of the Federal Estate Tax Act. It stated that thirty-six states were induced
to make material changes in their laws because of the credit provision.70
Had the Court been disposed to draw a distinction as to the basis of the
amount of coercion, it might have done so. In the case of the Federal Es-
tate Tax Act there was an eighty per cent credit instead of a ninety per cent;
there had previously been estate or inheritance taxes in almost every state,
whereas only a few states had unemployment compensation laws; the thirty-
six states which changed their inheritance or estate tax laws did so over
a period of seven years, whereas forty-three states adopted unemployment
compensation laws in less than two years, and by July, 1937, every state
'Even the three judges of the Federal District Court which held the Alabama law
invalid found no coercion by the Federal Government. Gulf States Paper Corporation v.
Carmichael, 17 F. Supp. 225, 229 (1936). The Supreme Court of Alabama also found
no coercion. Beeland Wholesale Co. v. Kaufman, 174 So. 516 (Ala. 1937). The same
was true as to the Massachusetts Act, Howes Bros. Co. v. Mass. Unemployment Comp.
Commission, 5 N. E. (2d) 720 (Mass. 1936) and the California Act, Gillum v. Johnson.
62 P. (2d) 1037, 108 A. L. R. 595 (Cal. 1936). However in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
298 U. S. 238, 56 Sup. Ct. 855, 20 L. ed. 1160 (1935) the Court seems to have been im-
pressed by the statements of the representatives of a number of the coal mining states
that there was no coercion on the states. That case, however, involved the comxierce
power rather than the taxing power.
'The previous cases were Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923) and Florida
v. Mellon, 273 U. S. 12 (1927). Thus no weight seems to have been given to the con-
tention that the latter case only held that Florida had no standing to test the constitu-
tionality of the estate tax because it could show no direct injury and that the remainder
of the opinion was dictum. See Mackes, The Strange Case of Florida v. Mellon (1928)
13 CORNELL L. Q. 351.
'The Court cited Perkins, State Action Under the Federal Estate Tax Credit Clause
(1935) 13 No. CAlL L. REv. 271, 280. Possibly the rejection of the ninety per cent re-
bate provision in the Guffey Coal Act may be reconciled on the ground that there state
action was not involved. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936). The govern-
ment had argued in the Carter. Case that an exercise of the power to regulate com-
merce was involved. The rebate provision was thought analogous to the Social Security
Credit by a former Assistant Attorney General. Youngquist, Administration and Effect
of Social Security Legislation (1937) 21 MINN. L. REV. Supp. 46, 56.
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had such a law; and the changes in the estate and inheritance laws were
confined to the very largest estates. It seems fair to conclude that having
decided that the coercion or inducement was for a constitutional purpose,
the Court was not concerned with the degree of coercion.
The Court is careful to say that its holding is not to be interpreted as
permitting Congress an unlimited power to impose conditions or credits with
respect to federal taxes. Congress could not lay a tax containing a condi-
tion that a state might escape a tax through the adoption of a statute unre-
lated in subject matter to activities fairly within the scope of national policy
and power. Mr. Justice Butler in his dissenting opinion stated:
"And, if valid as so employed, this tax and credit device may be
made effective to enable federal authorities to induce, if not indeed to
compel, state enactments for any purpose within the realm of state
power and generally to control state administration of state laws. ' 7 1
The Title IX tax was distinguished from that involved in United States v.
Butler72 on several grounds. The Title IX tax was not earmarked for a
special group. The unemployment compensation law which was necessary
before the credit might be obtained had been passed by the state, whereas
no state action was contemplated in the case of the Agricultural Adjustment
Act. There was no irrevocable agreement linked with the condition since the
state might at its pleasure repeal its unemployment compensation law. The
condition is directed at a lawful end, the relief of unemployment.
The Court might have distinguished the previous improperly regulatory
tax cases as follows: There were two types of such cases (1) where the ul-
terior purpose of the tax, if accomplished at all, would be accomplished at the
point of collection; and (2) where the ulterior purpose of the tax Would
be accomplished at a later point as through the spending of the funds. The
Child Labor Tax case 73 and Hill v. Wallace74 were examples of the former;
United States v. Butler 5 was an example of the latter. The Social Security
taxes clearly were not of the former type since there was no intention to
regulate persons paying the tax; they could not escape the tax by complying
with certain regulations prescribed by the government. The apparently
regulatory provisions in Title IX really were not regulatory but were merely
181 L. ed. 779, 802, 803. The Circuit Court for the First Circuit in holding that there was
coercion said in George P. Davis v. Boston and Maine R. Co., 89 F. (2d) 368, 379,(1937): "If the United States can take control by the coercive use of taxation, it
can equally take control of education and local health conditions by levying a heavy tax
and remitting it in the states which confoiin their educational system or their health
laws to the dictates of a Federal Board."
7'297 U. S. 180, 56 Sup. Ct. 312, 102 A. L. R. 914 (1936).
"Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U. S. 20, 21 A. L. R. 1432 (1922).
"
4Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44 (1922).
'British Columbia Mills Tug & Barge Co. v. Mylraie, 259 U. S. 1, 102 A. L. R. 914
(1922).
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descriptive of what a state unemployment compensation law is. Nor were
these taxes of the second type since they were not earmarked for any par-
ticular purpose or, at least, not earmarked for an improper purpose.76
In the case of Titles II and VIII, there was quite dearly no coercion of
the states since the old age benefits program was a strictly national one.
Title VIII had no credit provisions. Persons receiving the benefits under
Title II are not required by way of contract or condition to act or refrain
from acting in any manner, as they were under the Agricultural Adjustment
Act.77 In fact, persons are not coerced into retiring in order to received their
benefits, since for a long time at least benefit payments will be much smaller
than wages. It was doubtless, however, the object of the drafters of the act
to bring about the retirement of workers over sixty-five so that younger
persons might get their jobs; but the means they used were wholly ineffectual,
and the repeal of the requirement of quitting employment has been frequently
urged on the ground of hardship to the worker.78 The government might
have met this argument of coercion to a slight extent by pointing out that
the worker could engage in work n6t covered by the Act and still draw his
monthly benefits.7 9 Moreover, workers who received lump sum payments
instead of monthly benefits were not required to withdraw from any type
of employment or work. Finally, although this involved connecting up Titles
II and VIII, employees over sixty-five were exempted from taxation.
From a purely logical standpoint it may seem anomalous that the tax credit
device used to obtain the passage of state unemployment compensation laws
should have been thought more dubious than the strictly national plan em-
bodied in federal old age benefits.8 0 The tax credit device was designed
to give the states a voice while the old age benefits plan completely ignores the
states. Seven Justices thought the national plan valid as to old age pensions.
Five thought the tax credit plan valid as to unemployment compensation
though it should be noted that two others dissented, largely because of the
Unemployment Trust Fund. The holding would seem to justify the view of
That earmarking per se is not unconstitutional if for a proper purpose, was held in
Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 57 Sup. Ct. 764 (1937). In that case a tax
on the processing of cocoanut oil of Philippine production was earmarked for the
Treasury of the Philippine Island.
77Kowever, it is asserted that "Title II provides what is in effect a compulsory saving
plan." Charles Denby, Jr., The Case Against the Constitutionality of the Social Security
Act (1936) 3 LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 315, 317.
'PAUL H. DOUGLAS, SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES (1936).
'§ 202 (d) cuts off persons receiving wages with respect to "regular employment."
§ 210 (b) provides that where the term "employment" is used in Title II it means only
covered employment. However this contention might be inconsistent with another argu-
ment advanced by the government, namely, that benefits under Title VIII were based on
a means test since the worker had to cease work of any kind whether covered by the
Act or not.
'Powell, The Processing Tax atfd the Social Security Act (1936) 5 BR'KLYN L.
REv., 125, 136.
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those who thought that a national system of unemployment compensation should
have been adopted.8 ' Interestingly enough the Canadian national unemploy-
ment insurance system was held unconstitutional first by the Supreme Court
of Canada8 2 and subsequently by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Coun-
cil.83 However, the Canadian Act was not intended to be a taxing act. Fur-
ther, the Canadian Act expressly forbade the, deduction of the employer's
contribution from the wages of employees. Both decisions were by divided
courts.
Very closely related to the argument of coercion on the states is the con-
tention that under Sections 903 and 904 the states are called upon to sur-
render powers necessary to their quasi-sovereign existence. Section 903 lays
down the criteria which a state unemployment law must meet.84 Section
904 sets up an Unemployment Trust Fund in which the state unemployment
compensation funds are to be deposited. The Court upheld Section 903 as
merely requiring that a state unemployment compensation law be such in
fact. It pointed out that the states were given considerable latitude as to
which type of law they should enact. They might adopt the pooled unem-
ployment or unemployment reserve type. They might establish systems of
merit rating, effective at once or later. They might provide for employee
contributions or put the whole burden on the employer.
The Court does not definitely rule that all the conditions required in Section
903 are valid, but suggests that if some particular condition be found invalid
as too uncertain for enforcement, it might be severed from others without
affecting their validity. Moreover, a state might repeal its law at any time;
it does not enter into a contract. The Court specifically considered the
validity of Section 903 (a) (1) under which a state law to be certified must
provide that "All compensation is to be paid through public employment
offices in the state or such other agencies as the Board may approve." Such
a condition is not improper for several reasons. The state might disregard it,
'EPSTEIN, INSECURITY, A CAALLENGE TO AMERICA (3d ed. 1936) 696: STEWART,
SOCIAL SECURITY (1937) 118; Powell, The Processing Tax and the Social Security Act
(1936) 5 BR'KLYN L. REv. 125, 137; Cowan, The Social Security Act and Free Judicial
Choice (1937) 9 Miss. L. J. 407, 415.
'Reference re: The Employment and Social Insurance Act (1936) S. C. R. 427.
'Attorney-General of Canada v. Attorney-General of Ontario, Privy Council Appeal,
No. 101 of 1936.
8 The Federal Estate Tax Act involved no such elaborate criteria as to what is a state
inheritance act. The government agreed that the latter term had a standardized mean-
ing not requiring detailed description. GEN. Doc. No. 53, 75th CONG. 1st Sess. 108 (1937).
If the Court had been disposed to find the act unconstitutional it might have seized upon
this distinction, Professor T. R. Powell says in The Processing Tax and the Social
Security Act, (1936) 5 BR'xLYN L. REv. 125, 137: "Yet there is a fairly big difference
in degree between a practical inducement to adopt an inheritance tax and a practical
inducement to adopt an intricate and far-reaching compensation plan. It is not a con-
stitutional difference until made such by the Supreme Court." See also Cowan, The
Social Security Act and Free Judicial Choice (1937) 9 Miss. L. J. 407, 424, 87.
102 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
with the 6nly result that the tax credit will be lost. Also, the approval of the
Social Security Board is not required if the state makes use of public em-
ployment offices as the disbursing instruments. It is proper that the Board
approve other agencies in order that the agency be responsible. Nor is Section
903 (a) (4), providing that "all money withdrawn from the Unemploy-
ment Trust Fund by the State Agency shall be used solely in the payment of
cordpensation, exclusi-e of expenses of administration" invalid. The state
might repeal its law at any time. The Federal Government may not insist
on the payment of the money for compensation by suit or other means, but
may simply withdraw the credit. The Court might have added that this pro-
vision supplies an essential element of an unemployment compensation plan,
namely, that the funds accumulated be used to pay benefits to unemployed
persons and not for other purposes.
Section 904 setting up the Unemployment Trust Fund is not invalid, nor is
Section 903 (a) (3) which supplements it. A state might repeal its un-
employment compensation law. It might withdraw its deposits from the
Fund. Deposit with the Secretary of the Treasury would result in greater
protection of the funds during times of depression. That is to say the
federal fiscal powers justify these provisions.
It was to these two Sections, particularly the latter, that Mr. Justice
Sutherland took such exception when he found the whole title invalid.85 A
state with a certified law was bound to deposit its unemployment compensa-
tion funds in the Federal Treasury. A state could withdraw such money
only on complying with federal restrictions. It could, upon so withdraw-
ing, use shch money only for unemployment compensation. Such compensa-
tion could be paid only through public employment offices in the state or
such other agencies as a federal board might approve . 6 The Justice admits
that a state may repeal its law, but interprets the act as not allowing a
state to withdraw its funds unconditionally in such event. The majority
apparently interpreted the statute otherwise.8 7 It would seem that the minority
has violated the fundamental rule in constitutional cases, that constitutional
issues should be avoided if one reasonable interpretation of a statute is such
as to make it constitutional. 88 Mr. Justice Sutherland also objects to Section
981 L. ed. 779, 799, 802 (1936).
'Agreeing that this condition is invalid are William E. Brown and Harold W. Story.
Constitutionality of the Unemployment Compensation Features of the Social Security
Act 1936) 11 NoTRE DAME LAWYER 245, 268. They assert that the states would
provide as good machinery as the Board could suggest and that this condition does not
protect the federal credit. They also object to § 903 (a) (5) providing that compensa-
tion shall not be denied under certain conditions relating to labor disputes.
'In the Alabama State Unemployment Compensation case, Mr. Justice Stone, in the
majority opinion, states that a state upon withdrawing its money may "use it for any
public purpose." Carmichael v. So. Coal & Coke Co., 81 L. ed. 811, 825 (1936).
'Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 56 Sup. Ct. 466, 483 (1936).
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903 (b) which forbids the Social Security Board to certify states failing
to comply with provisions of the Act on the ground that this makes the Board
an overseer of the state. He also makes the seemingly trivial and technical
objection that under Section 904 (f) payment out of the Federal 'Treasury
of state moneys may be made only to the state agency and only of such
amount as that agency may duly requisition. 89
Federal Old Age Benefits
In the case of the unemployment insurance provisions of the Social Security
Act, the Court found it necessary to pass only upon the taxing provisions.
Only the validity of Title IX was, therefore, considered. But in the case
of the federal old age benefits program, the Court passed, not only on the
taxing provision with respect to employers as found in Title VIII, but also
on the appropriations and benefits provisions as found in Title II. It should
be noted, however, that Title II differs'materially from Title III in that
Title II deals directly with benefits to be paid to employees under a strictly
national old age benefits program the money for which, more obviously, is
to be obtained from a tax levied in another title of the Act; while Title III
is concerned with sums to be paid not to employees but to states to be used
not to pay benefits but for the administration of state employment compensa-
tion laws and the money for which is not so clearly to be obtained from a
tax levied in another Title of the Act.
A strict application of Massachusetts v. Mellon" would seem to have
barred any attack upon Title II except on the theory that it was connected
with Title VIII. A taxpayer could not attack an appropriation per se. A tax-
payer was allowed to attack the Agricultural Adjustment tax only because
his tax was earmarked for an unlawful appropriation. The Court expressly
ruled that providing for old-age benefits is within the power of Congress
to spend for the general welfare.9 1 Just as spending to relieve unemployment
is for the general welfare so is spending for the aged. The Court stated that
the view of Congress as to what expenditures are for the general welfare
would be followed unless Congress acted arbitrarily. Having stated this prin-
'Mr. Justice Sutherland could not consistently throw out Title IX on the ground of
coercion, in the light of his opinions in Massachusetts v. Mellon and Florida v. Mellon.
But considerable weight is given to his reasoning in a note in (1937) 32 ILL. L. REv.
80, 88.
90262 U. S. 447 (1922).
"Mr. Justice McReynolds, in his dissenting opinion in the Federal Unemployment
Insurance Tax case, cited at length a message by President Pierce vetoing an act of
Congress making a grant of public lands to the states for the benefit of indigent insane
persons. Charles C. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 81 L. ed. 779, 794-799 (1936). In
the Old Age Pension case, Mr. Justice Cardozo, in the majority opinion states in 81 L.
ed. 804, 808: "Congress may spend money in aid of the 'general welfare'. There have
been great statesmen in our history who have stood for other views. We will not resur-
rect the contest. It is now settled by decision, United States v. Butler."
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ciple, the Court went on to consider the propriety of old age benefits on the
merits and found the problem national in scope.
The language of the Court in United States v. Butler9 2 condemning the
"expropriation of money from one group for the benefit of another" as in
violation of due process and similar language in Railroad Retirement Board
v. Alton R. R. Co.,93 seems not to have troubled the Court in the Social
Security cases. Obviously it could not apply to the Title IX tax since the
Court expressly found that there was no connection between Titles IX and
III. Moreover, the money paid under Title III was not to be paid to individ-
uals but to states and wag to be used by the states not to pay to unemployed
individuals but for the expenses of administration of the State Act.
In the case of Titles II and VIII, however, the Court made no finding
of separability. The benefits under Title II were to be paid to individuals
and to be paid them directly by the Federal Government. But the Court
found that such payments were for the general welfare. Though the Court
did not say so, it probably has returned to the common sense view that many
if not all taxes are exactions from one group for the benefit of another.94
The income tax on workers levied under Title VIII was clearly for their
own benefit.9 5 The excise tax levied on employers was not so obviously bene-
ficial to them though it would add to the contentment of their workers."" Aside
from the legal aspects, the employer, as in the case of workmen's compensa-
tion, would pass the expense on to the consumers97 who would in many cases
be workers. In fact, one of the sharpest criticisms of the Social Security Act
has been that the funds for the benefits to be paid out will come very largely
from the pockets of the workers, particularly those with low wages.9 8 There
is no contribution from the government as in many other nations and no
graduated income or inheritance taxis are levied on those with large incomes.
In upholding the scheme of federal old age benefits, the Court seems not to
have been troubled by any possible contention that the Constitution forbade
the Federal Government from embarking in business in competition with
"297 U. S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 312, 317 (1936).
"295 U. S. 330, 357 (1935). This case, however, involved an exercise of the com-
merce power.
"In the Alabama State Unemployment Compensation Law case, Mr. Justice Stone,
makes a lucid statement of this view. Supra Note 8. [See "A General View of the In-
come Tax" by Irving Fisher, supra p. 39-Ed.]
"The court did not, however, pass on the tax on employees.
'But no weight was given to such contention in Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton
R. Co., 295 U. S. 330, 55 Sup.'Ct. 758, 770 (1935).
'Mr. Justice Stone, in the Alabama State Unemployment Compensation case, supra
note 87, p. 824; Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Social Justice ahd Business Costs (1936) 49 HARv.
L. REv. 593, 608.
'BURNS, TowARDS SOCIAL SECURIr (1936) 153-175; DOUGLAS, SOCIAL SEcUarrY IN
THE UNITED STATES (1936) 62-28; EPSTEIN, INSECURITY, A CHALLENGE TO AuERICA
(3rd ed. 1936) 4?-49, 769; note (1935) 35 COL. L. REa. 1262, 1277.
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private enterprise.99 As a practical matter, many workers covered by the
act would not take out private insurance anyhow. Insurance agents frequently
praise the act as making the public better acquainted with the value of in-
surance. But even if the act did result in competition with private business
or were so amended as to result in such competition, that would not con-
demn the act. So long as it can be shown that such competition was a
result of the exercise of a power granted by the Constitution, then the conse-
quence is one permitted by the Constitution. The Tennessee Valley Authority,
the Land Banks, and the War Risk Insurance Act are all examples of legiti-
mate competition with private enterprise. Indeed, putting old age pensions
on an insurance rather than a relief basis may be regarded as an exercise, not
only of the taxing power, but also of the fiscal powers inasmuch as the drain
on the federal treasury is tremendously relieved. Also, perhaps it will not
be splitting hairs to say that the old age benefits program legally and factually
is not insurance. 10 0 No contracts are entered into. Benefits are not paid ac-
cording to the amount of taxes paid, that is to say, the lower salaried work-
ers and older workers just coming under the Act receive more benefits in
proportion to taxes paid than do higher salaried or younger workers. Finally,
workers are required to retire as a prerequisite to the payment of monthly
benefits.
Separability of Appropriation and Taxing Titles
It was the finding of the Court that Title III, providing for appropriations
for the grants to the states for the administration of unemployment com-
pensation laws, was separable from Title IX. levying a tax. The validity of
Title III was therefore, not at issue according to the opinion of the Court.""1
Title III made no appropriations but was simply an authorization to appro-
priate. Title IX would stand unaltered even though Title III were repealed
or omitted. The Court might also have concluded that the Titles were separ-
able (1) since there are several other Titles between them, (2) since Title
IX does not expressly state that the tax is to be the basis of the appropriations
made under Title III, (3) since the spending is provided for first instead
of last, (4) since a certified law under Title IX differs somewhat from an
approved plan under Title III (thus holding forth a separate inducement),
(5) since the Title IX tax goes into the general funds, and (6) since there
was a separability clause. If the Court had been at all inclined to follow
9°Professor Thomas Reed Powell reminds us in The Processing Tax and the Social
Security Act (1936) 5 BR'RLYN L. REv. 125, 136 "That ultimate judical notion of what
encroaches too much on the idea of rugged individualism always has to be faced, and the
best of technical argument must often bow in defeat."
'0'Lynch v. United States, 291 U. S. 571, 576-577 (1933).
'
1Even if the Court had found Title IX invalid when considered by itself, it would not
have automatically followed that Title III would also be found invalid.
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the realism of United States v. Butler,02 it might well have found a rela-
tion between Titles III and IX on the ground that both Titles are in the
same act whose stated purpose is to provide aid to the states for the
administration of their unemployment compensation laws and also on the
ground that the state plans under both. Titles are much alike. Section 303
(a) makes specific reference to laws "approved by the Board under Title IX."
A finding of such relation would not have meant the overthrow of either or
both Titles since it was a tax for the general welfare. 03
The Court even went so far as to say that although there had been no
separability clause, the two Titles would still be regarded as separable. The
narrow doctrine of Carter v. Carter Coal Co.10 4 received no mention. Al-
though it was argued in the Old Age Pension case that Titles II and VIII
were separable, the Court did not so rule as it had in the case of Titles III
and IX. Any ruling on separability was rendered unnecessary since the
Court expressly ruled that Title II was valid,10 5 whereas it had made no
ruling as to the validity of Title III.
If the Court had gone into the issue of separability it might have considered
the following arguments: There is no express tie-up between Titles II and
VIII. The taxes levied under Title VIII are not earmarked but go into the
general funds of the government. The appropriations are to be made from
the general funds. No reference is made in either Title to the other. There
was a separability clause.
On the other hand the Court might have considered the fact that the
preamble of the Act stated as one of its purposes the establishing of a system
of federal old age benefits, that the same workers who paid taxes and with
respect to whom their employers paid taxes under Title VIII were to receive
benefits under Title II, and that at least a rough correspondence between
the amount of taxes received and benefits paid was intended. 10
1
'United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 312, 80 L. ed. 477, 102 A. L. R. 914
(1936).
"For an argument that even though Titles III and IX were treated as connected they
would still be valid, see Brown and Story, Constitutionality of the Unemployment Compen-
sation Features of the Federal Social Security Act (1936) 11 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 245,
254. The Circuit Court seems to have treated the title as connected. 89 F. (2d) 207, 209
(1937). The Circuit Court for the First Circuit held that the titles were connected and the
act unconstitutional. George P. Davis v. Boston and Maine R., 89 F. (2d) 368, 377 (1937).
"0298 U. S. 238, 56 Sup. Ct. 855, 80 L. ed. 1160 (1935).
"In the District Court Title VIII was ruled to be separable in view of the separability
provision of the Social Security Act and the Court did not pass on Title II. Davis v.
Edison Electric Illuminating Co. of Boston, 18 F. Supp. (D. Mass. 1937). The Circuit
Court held that the titles were connected. 89 F. (2d) 383, 385 (1937). It has been
argued that United States v. Butler, if followed, would compel the court to consider
whether or not the two titles were regulatory, therefore independently valid. Note
(1937) 32 ILL. L. REv. 80, 94. But such a view would greatly cramp the use of the
taxing power.
"The District Court for the District of Columbia held inseparable not simply taxing
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It may perhaps be concluded that as to the Title IX tax the government
had two defenses either of which was sufficient to uphold constitutionality,
namely, (1) that no definite relation was shown between the taxes and the
exercise of governmental powers objected to, and (2) that even if such rela-
tion were shown Congress was taxing for the general welfare. 0 7 As to
the Title VIII tax, only the latter defense was clearly sustained by the Court.
Holding as it did that none of the Titles challenged was unconstitutional,
the Court was not forced to decide upon the separability of the grants-in-
aid Titles of the Social Security Act (except Title III). That such Titles are
separable seems dear. They may be administered without reference to other
Titles of the Act; no provision is made for taxes to raise the appropriations
made by the Title; the purpose of such Titles is for the general welfare; and
there is a separability clause. Yet only four out of the eight members of the
Committee on Social Security and Unemployment Insurance Law of the
American Bar Association definitely thought such Titles separable. The report
of the Committee finding all Titles of the Act invalid was not adopted by the
American Bar Association at its 1936 meeting.
Delegation of Legislative Power -
Such cases as Panama Refining Company v. Ryan0 8 and Schechter Corp. v.
United States0 9 involved chiefly important questions concerning delegation
of legislative power. The Social Security cases involved a number of such
problems but the Supreme Court did not touch upon them.
In a case arising in the state of Washington, Johnson v. State,x1 9 in which
the Washington unemployment compensation law was found invalid, it
was argued to the Court that since the tax credits depend upon state law, it
is the state law which fixes the federal tax rate. The case of Florida v.
Mellon,"' however, had approved such credits. In a number of cases it had
been held that Congress may make the operation of federal law depend on
state legislation." 2 In the same case it was argued that Section 906, per-
and benefit titles but two taxing and benefit acts passed the same day by Congress in a
case involving the Second Railroad Retirement Act. Alton R. Co. v. Railroad Retire-
ment Board, 16 F. Supp. 955 (1936). A third act has since been passed.
'See the excellent analysis by Jane Alvies, "The Constitutiomiality of the Unemploy-
vnent Insurance Titles of the Social Security Act," an unpublished study in the Yale
University School of Law.
]D293 U. S. 388 (1934).
"3295 U. S. 495 (1934).1160 P. (2d) 681 (Wash. 1936).
m273 U. S. 12 (1927).
'Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 181, 46 L. ed. 113 (1902) ; Clark Dis-
tilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 242 U. S. 311, 61 L. ed. 326 (1917) ; First
National Bank v. Union Trust Co., 244 U. S. 416, 61 L. ed. 1233 (1917). The case of
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149, 64 L. ed. 834 (1920), which was cited
on argument as contra, in reality turned on the peculiar constitutional provision ap-
plicable to jurisdiction in admiralty.
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mitting state acts to apply to transactions in interstate commerce, constituted
a delegation of legislative power. But here again the Supreme Court has
expressly held that Congress may withdraw the protection of the Commerce
Clause.113 It has even held that an act of Congress permitting states to
tax federal instrumentalities otherwise exempt is valid." 4
Probably the most important problem concerning delegation of legislative
power was that arising under Section 302 (a) of Title III, one which was
avoided since the Court found it unnecessary to pass upon Title III. This
Section authorized the Social Security Board to determine the amount to be
granted to states for the expense of administering their unemployment com-
pensation laws. The government, it would seem, met this argument effectively
by pointing out (1) that the Constitution does not require Congress to specify
in detail the manner in which public money is to be expended and (2) that
proper standards were provided to guide the Board.115 The English prac-
tice," 6 the practice of the Colonies and of the states," 7 all have recognized that
the details of an expenditure is not a legislative function. The same result
has been arrived at in a number of recent decisions of the lower federal courts
concerning New Deal legislation." 8 A recent Supreme Court decision would
seem to settle the issue." 8 4
Moreover, even though the doctrine of delegation of legislative powers were
applicable, the Section supplies adequate standards." 9 The primary standard
was the amount "which the Board determines to be necessary for the
proper administration of such law during the fiscal year." This standard was
further defined by the specifications of four other factors which the Board is
required to take into consideration: (1) The population of the state; (2)
an estimate of the number of people covered by the state law; (3) the
'In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 35 L. ed. 572 (1891) ; Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U. S. 471,
80 L. ed. 778 (1936).
"(Van Allen v. The State Assessors, 3 Wall 573, 18 L. ed. 229 (1866) ; Baltimore Na-
tional Bank v. State Tax Commission, 297 U. S. 209, 80 L. ed. 586 (1876).
'See Brief for the Respondent, Charles C. Stewart Mach. Co. v. Davis, pp. 140-149.
"
1 Corwin, Constitutional Aspects of Federal Housing (1935) 84 U. oF PA. L. REv. 131.
163.
'aPeople v. Tremaine, 252 N. Y. 27, 168 N. E. 817 (1930); State ex rel Bonsteel
Allen 83 Fla. 214, 91 So. 104, 26 A. L. R. 735 (1922) ; Abbott v. Commissioners, 160 Ga.
657, 129 S. E. 38 (1925) ; Edwards v. Childer, 102 Okla. 158 (19 ) ; Holmes v. Olcott,
96 Ore. 33, 189 Pac. 202 (1920) ; State v. Zimmerman, 183 Wis., 132, 196 N. W. 848
(1924). See also United States v. Hansen, 167 Fed. 881 (C. C. A. 9th 1909).
'Kansas Gas and Electric Co. v. City of Independence, 79 F. (2d) 32 (C. C. A. 10th
1935) ; Greenwood County v. Duke Power Co., 81 F. (2d) 986 (C. C. A. 4th 1936).
See contra, Franklin Township v. Tugwell, 85 F. (2d) 208 (App. D. C. 1936), where,
however the argument here made was not presented to or considered by the court.
I'Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 57 Sup. Ct. 764, 770, 81 L. ed. 707, 714 (1937).
This holding is cited in Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 91 F. (2d) 665, 674,
(C. C. A. 4th 1937).
'No such standards existed in Franklin Township v. Tug-well, 85 F. (2d) 208 (App.
D. C. 1936).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND REGULATORY ASPECTS
total for all states must not exceed the appropriated amount; and (4) such
other factors as the Board finds relevant. These standards are well within
the prior decisions of the Court.12 0
State Unemployment Compensation Laws
The state unemployment compensation laws have been asserted to violate
the Fourteenth Amendment chiefly on three grounds: (1) that the burden is
imposed upon employers, who as a class, it is alleged, are not responsible for
unemployment; (2) that it is unfair to assess all employers" at the same rate,
regardless of regularity of employment; and (3) that the pooling principle
under which the unemployed in one industry may draw benefits from a
fund to which other industries must contribute is unconstitutional under the
decision in Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. R. Co.1 21
As to the first argument there are several possible answers. Although
unemployment in many cases cannot be controlled by employers, it does
occur largely as a result of maladjustments in the industrial process itself.
Furthermore, even during normal times, industry has to keep a "reservoir"
of labor. Finally, there are numerous instances where the cost of a necessary
evil has been allocated to a particular group, out of whose activity the evil
arises. The best examples are the workmen's compensation cases. 122
As to the second argument, that it is unreasonable to assess all employers
at the same rate irrespective of their employment experience, it should be noted
that almost every state law, including the Alabama law, provides for an
eventual differentiation on the basis of employment experience. The New
York Law which did not do so but simply provided for study of the problem
was, however, upheld by a four to four decision of the Supreme Court. 23
In all states the rates are uniform for at least the early years.
Since almost every state which made provision for unemployment com-
pensation has adopted the pooled fund system, the holding of the Supreme
Court in the Alabama State Unemployment Compensation case was of
the utmost importance. The decision in Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton
R. R. Co.12- had seemed to cast serious doubt as to the constitutionality of
pooled fund insurance. In that case, however, the uniform rate upon the rail-
roads was prescribed in spite of the existence of facts, pleaded and proved,
that from the outset the age groups employed differed widely among the
'Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 692 (1892) ; Hampton and Co. v. United States, 276
U. S. 394 (1927).1295 U. S. 330, 55 Sup. Ct. 758, 79 L. ed. 146 (1935).
'New York Central Railroad Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 37 Sup. Ct. 247, 6 L. ed. 667
(1917) ; Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 37 Sup. Ct. 260, 61 L. ed. 685
(1917). See James A. Pike, Unemployment Inmirance and Workmeins Compensation
(1937) 10 So. CALIF. L. REv. 253.
12W. H. H. Chamberlin v. Andrews, 299 U. S. 515, 57 Sup. Ct. 122 (1936).295 U. S. 330, 55 Sup. Ct. 758 (1935).
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various roads. The Railroad Retirement Act also operated retroactively. It
involved an exercise of the commerce power and not of the taxing power.
The opinion did not purport to overrule the holdings in earlier'cases involv-
ing uniform rates and pooled funds. 25 There was nothing in the opinion
indicating that a pooled fund with contributions at a uniform rate would be
unreasonable in a statute which acted wholly prospectively, since there was
then no existing basis in fact for varying the contribution rates among
employees.1 26
Conclusion
The Social Security decisions made clear a number of matters which had
previously been obscure. A state unemployment compensation law might
be regarded as an exercise of the state taxing power. The federal exactions
to secure the passage of state unemployment compensation laws and for old
age pensions were also taxes, those on employers being excise taxes. Both
the state and the national government might impose taxes on the right of the
employer to employ. The federal taxes on employers meet the test of uni-
formity required of federal excise taxes.
Both the state and the national government have wide powers to select
the subjects of taxation and to grant exemptions. Hence, they might exempt
employers of less than eight, employers of agricultural laborers, domestic
servants, seamen, close relatives, charitable workers, government employees,
and seasonal workers. Such exemptions might be justified by considerations
of administrative convenience and expense.
If a tax on employees is levied whether by state or nation, the employer
will not be allowed to raise the question of constitutionality.
A state in taxing for unemployment compensation is taxing for a public
purpose within the Fourteenth Amendment. The national government in
taxing for the same purpose and for old age pensions is taxing for the
general welfare of the United States. Whether such *expenditures are for
the general welfare is primarily for the legislature and Congress to decide
and the courts will only interfere in the case of arbitrary action.
A state may pay unemployment compensation to employees without proof
of indigence and even to employees discharged for cause. The effect of the
decision in Title VIII seems to be that the Federal Government may pay
old age pensions to persons not in need, though the government argued
that a needs test was set up. A state may pay unemployment benefits to
individuals without violating the rule that the public money must be spent for
a public purpose. Likewise, Congress under its power to tax and spend
for the general welfare may pay old age benefits to individuals.
' Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 37 Sup. Ct. 260, 61 L. ed. 685
(1917) ; Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 31 Sup. Ct. 186, 55 L. ed. 112 (1911);
'Thomas Reed Powell, Commerce, Pensions and Codes (1935) 49 HARv. L. REV. 1.
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A state may not only select certain classes of employers to pay taxes for
employment compensation, but may also select certain classes of employees
to receive the benefits, particularly where such employees are the employees
of those who pay the tax, the doctrine of administrative convenience and
expense applying. Inferentially, the same is true as to old age pensions paid
by the Federal Government.
A state may compel individuals to pay taxes for unemployment compensa-
tion though they have not contributed to the unemployment and may not
be benefited by the expenditure. This seems to be a circumlocutious way
of saying that employers as a class may be compelled to pay even though un-
employment has not been a result of their acts. Moreover, not only may
employers be compelled to contribute, but they may be compelled to con-
tribute irrespective of their employment experience. Pooled fund unem-
ployment compensation laws are, therefore, valid. This is on the theory that
where a tax is valid as a tax and the purpose is a legal purpose, the tying-in
of the tax and the expenditure is immaterial. The want of knowledge as
to the causes of unemployment is an additional though not indispensable
reason for permitting pooled fund laws. Employees are better protected;
and employers may add to the price of their products and thus shift the
tax. The Court does not lay down any requirement of merit rating even
when more accurate and complete data became available.
Not only are state unemployment compensation acts valid in and of
themselves, but they are valid in spite of the fact that the Federal Govern-
ment has induced their passage. The pressure exerted by the Federal Govern-
ment was inducement not coercion; the Court does not say that even coercion
would render a state act invalid. A state may legitimately deposit its employ-
ment compensation fund in the Treasury of the United States; and the
United States may legitimately require such deposit. The federal and the
state governments may properly cooperate to relieve unemployment through
state laws and a federal tax credit system.
The Title IX tax is not coercive because of its credit clause. The Court
does not deny that a credit clause may be separated from the revenue
provisions of the tax. Even if inseparable, the credit clause is not coercive.
Inducement by the Federal Government is proper since expenditures for the
relief of unemployment are for the general welfare. Since a credit clause
permits the states to act more freely for the general welfare and to coop-
erate better with the federal government this shows inducement not coercion.
This is particularly true when the drain on the Federal Treasury is relieved.
The credit clause is also proper since it prevents double taxation. The Court
even throws doubt on the existence of any concept of undue influence as
between state and nation. Even if the existence of such a concept be ad-
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mitted, it would be a question of degree when such pressure turned into
unconstitutional compulsion, and no such compulsion was shown here. The
credit provision related to a subject matter within the scope of national power
since there was less drain on the Federal Treasury. The Court denies that
every sort of credit provision would be valid, and the credit provision in
Florida v. Mellon supplies a precedent though the Court intimates that no
precedent would be needed.
The various provisions which a state unemployment compensation act
must contain do not call for a surrender of the quasi-sovereign powers of
the state since they are merely criteria of a state unemployment compensa-
tion act and leave broad discretion to the states. Compliance with the condi-
tions does not amount to a contract by the states since the state act may be
repealed. The Unemployment Trust Fund does not violate the sovereign
powers since the state act may be repealed and the deposits withdrawn and
since the fiscal powers of the national government are safeguarded. Even if
there were a contract, such a contract would be valid since sovereigns may
contract.
Title III providing for grants to the states for the administration of their
unemployment compensation laws is separable from Title IX and would
be so even without a separability clause since Title III merely authorizes
appropriations and since Title III might be stricken out without affecting
Title IX. Hence, the Court did not pass on the validity of Title III.
But while the Court found Titles III and IX separable and did not
pass on the validity of Title III, it did determine the validity of Title II
as well as that of Title VIII and, therefore, found it unnecessary to pass on
the question whether the two Titles were separable. Presumably, the Court
thought the Titles connected since otherwise Massachusetts v. Mellon and
United States v. Butler would stand in the way of passing on the validity of
appropriations. The opinion does not make clear just why the Court passed
on the validity of Title II.
The decisions in the Social Security cases will go down in history as
landmark cases. They make social insurance whether carried on by the
national- or state governments feasible without Constitutional amendment.
Not only may the Federal Government cooperate with the states through
grants-in-aid and tax credits, but it may proceed to set up strictly material
systems. Content is poured into the term "general welfare." The national
taxing power is restored to its earlier vigor, if not actually enhanced. The
device of separating a' tax from an appropriation by having the tax flow into
the general treasury funds and having the appropriation come out of the
general funds is given the judicial blessing. After a period of negativism, if
not obstruction, the Supreme Court has turned back to the judicial states-
menship and creativeness of Chief Justice Marshall.
